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COMMENT
CHALLENGING AN ExECUTION AFTER
PROLONGED CONFINEMENT ON
DEATH Row [LACKEY REVISITED]
INTRODUCTION
According to the Bureau of Justice, the average death row inmate
spends nearly thirteen years on death row awaiting execution!
Largely attributable to the procedural safeguards implemented after
the reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976,2 the average delay
between sentencing and execution has nearly doubled within the past
two decades.3
Prolonged confinement, commonplace for today's capital
defendant, potentially gives rise to a "novel . . . [and] legally
complex'A claim. The so-called Lackey claim5  challenges the
combination of an execution with a significant period of confinement
under sentence of death as a violation of the Eighth Amendment
I Dep't of Just., Bureau of Just. Stat. Capital Punishment Statistical Tables, Time Under
Sentence of Death and Execution, by Race, 1977-2007 (Table 11), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2007/tables/cp07stll1 html [hereinafter DOJ Tables].
The average elapsed time from sentence to execution for all inmates was calculated at 153
months in 2007. Id.
2 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (holding that the praetice of capital
punishment does not invariably violate the U.S. Constitution).
3See DOJ Tables, supra note I (the average time between sentencing in execution in
1987 was approximately 86 months as compared with the current delay of 153 months).
4Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045-47 (1995) (Stevens, J.) (respecting the denial of
certi orari).
5Named after the litigant who gained notoriety as the first to assert the claim, or at least,
the first to attract a Supreme Courtjustice's attention.
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prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 6 While the novelty
of the claim may have worn off over the past decade,7 the question,
whether prolonged confinement on death row violates the Eighth
Amendment, remains unanswered by the lower courts and the
Supreme Court alike.
This past year, an inmate petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari to consider whether his impending execution, after well-
over over thirty years on death row, violated the Eighth Amendment. 8
The Court denied the inmate's request for certiorari, re-igniting an on-
going debate9 between three of the justices about the merits of this
potential Eighth Amendment claim and the legitimacy of a capital
punishment system that inevitably imposes a prolonged period of
confinement under sentence of death prior to the actual execution.' 0
Is it possible for prolonged confinement to go from simply an
unavoidable consequence of extensive appellate procedure to a form
of cruel and unusual punishment? In other words, is there a tipping
point in time where the courts must step in and say "enough is
enough"? With over three thousand inmates on death row
nationwide," the answer to this question has the "potential for far-
reaching consequences."'12
Part I of this Comment briefly describes the landscape of capital
punishment in the United States. Part II summarizes the arguments
supporting the claim that prolonged confinement on death row
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Part Ill discusses the
Supreme Court's treatment of the Lackey claim over the past decade.
Part IV then analyzes the common obstacles that prevent inmates
from successfully bringing Lackey claims and suggests possible
arguments for overcoming those obstacles. This Comment concludes
6 Id.
7The claim has been unsuccessfully asserted by inmates across the county. On at least
five occasions, the Supreme Court has considered (and denied) certiorari petitions dealing with
the Lackey clam. See infra Part 111.
8Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299 (2009).
9 See Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (denying certiorari to hear a claim of an
inmate on death row for twenty-seven years); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (denying
certiorari to hear the claims of two inmates who spent more than twenty years on death row);
Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (denying certiorari to hear the claim of an inmate on
death for twenty-three years); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (denying certiorari to hear
a claim of an inmate on death row for seventeen years).
10 Thompson, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299-3101 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari); id. at 1301-03 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); id. at 1303-04
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
'See Deborah Fins, Death Row U.S.A., QUARTERLY REPORT BY THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROJECT OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., Winter 2009, at 1,
available at http://www.naacpldforgl.
12 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047.
1250 Vol. 59:4
2009] ~CHALLENGING EX CUT ON 15
that it is necessary for the Supreme Court to conclusively resolve the
Lackey issue.
1. THE CURRENT STATE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
According to a recent study by the NAACP, there are currently
3,297 inmates on death row nationwide.'13 Thirty-five states and the
federal government permit capital punishment.'14 In 2009, fifty-two
executions occurred in the United States,'15 as compared to a high of
ninety-eight executions in 1998. 16 The Death Penalty Information
Center projected 106 new death sentences in 2009,17 also down from
a high of more than 300 in 1998. 18 To eliminate the death row
population, the states would have to execute one inmate every single
day for the next twelve years.'19
The Death Penalty Information Center reports that inmates
awaiting execution typically spend up to twenty-three hours per day
alone in their cells.20 Prisons often exclude death row inmates from
prison education and employment programs. 21 During this period of
isolated confinement, inmates experience a pervasive state of
uncertainty about their pending execution. 2
A recent summary of death row policies and conditions based on a
survey of thirty-seven state and federal facilities noted:
. while there is some variability in policy from state to
state, death row conditions nationally are characterized by
'rigid security, isolation, limited movement, and austere
conditions.' Not surprisingly, there is evidence that these
bleak conditions impact the psychological adjustment of
3 Fins, supra note 11, at 1.
14 Death Penalty info. Ctr., Facts About the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited May 1, 2010)
[hereinafter Fact Sheet].
15 Id,
6 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
9 As stated, the current death row population nationwide is 3,297 persons. Assuming a
conservative average of 100 new death sentences per year, the state could potentially reduce the
total number of inmates by approximately 265 inmates per year. To eliminate the backlog, then,
the state would have to execute an inmate every single day for twelve years.
20 The Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Time on Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
time-death-row (last visited May 1, 2010).
21 Id.
22 Id.
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death row inmates-many of whom spend years in this
statuS."23
The Supreme Court has remarked that the time spent awaiting
death is generally characterized by a general state of uncertainty
about when and how the execution will take place, and is "one of the
most horrible feelings to which [a person] can be subjected."24 Justice
Stephen Breyer recently argued that "it is difficult to deny the
suffering inherent in a prolonged wait for execution-a matter which
courts and judges have long recognized."2
As the number of prisoners on death row rises, the delay between
sentencing and execution will likely also continue to increase. As the
delay increases, so too does the potential for a constitutional
violation. The following section describes the potential Eighth
Amendment violation that might arise when a state attempts to
execute an inmate following a period of prolonged confinement.
11. THE LACKEY-STYLE ARGUMENT
Inmates asserting a Lackey claim argue that execution following
prolonged confinement on death row violates the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.2 Simply stated, the
claim challenges the combination of an execution with a period of
prolonged confinement on death row (generally not the execution or
the period of confinement alone). Even if capital punishment and
prolonged confinement are both constitutionally permissible, the
combination of the two may nonetheless be unconstitutional. Inmates
typically assert four basic arguments in support of their Lackey claim:
(1) an execution after prolonged confinement is contrary to society's
evolving standards of decency; (2) an execution after prolonged
confinement is contrary to the Framers' intent; (3) an execution after
prolonged confinement does not further the penological goals of
deterrence and retribution; and (4) an execution after prolonged
confinement is inconsistent with international norms.
23 Amy Smith, Not "Waiving " But Drowning: The Anatomy of Death Row Syndrome and
Volunteering for Execution, 17 R.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 237, 244 (2008) (citing Mark D.
Cunningham & Mark P. vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics, Adjustment, and
Confinement: A Critical Review of the Literature, 20 BEHAV. Sd. & L. 191, 204 (2002)).
24 I re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890) (holding that a four-week delay between
sentencing and execution constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
25 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 904 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995).
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A. Contrary to Society's Evolving Standards of Decency
The Eighth Amendment explicitly prohibits the infliction of "cruel
and unusual punishments."2 The phrase "cruel and unusual,"
however, is not subject to a specific definition. In Trop v. Dulles, the
Court stated:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man. . .. [Tihe words of the
Amendment are not precise, and . .. their scope is not static.
The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
28
society.
Whether a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment
must be judged by the standards that "currently prevail, 29 not those
of the past. In recent years, the Court has referenced society's
"evolving standards of decency" when assessing whether a
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. 3 0 In two recent Death
31 32Penalty cases, Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the
Supreme Court evaluated the propriety of executing mentally retarded
and juvenile offenders respectively by determining whether a national
consensus existed against executing these types of offenders. 33
If a federal court considered a Lackey claim on its merits, it would
likely consider society's "evolving standards of decency" 34 to resolve
the question. While the analysis would not be as straight forward as
the analysis in Atkins or Roper, a court could still engage in a similar
inquiry to assess whether execution after prolonged confinement
under sentence of death violates the Eighth Amendment. While
society's increasing reluctance to impose and carry out capital
punishment might generally suggest evolution away from the use of
capital punishment, there is little evidence to suggest that a national
consensus exists against executing persons who spend a prolonged
period of time on death row specifically.
27 U.S. Const. amend. Vill.
28 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (emphasis added).
29 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
30 Id. (holding that executing a mentally retarded person violates the "cruel and unusual"
clause of the Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution ofjuvenile offenders).
31 536 U.S. 304
32 543 U.S. 551
33 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 563; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
34 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
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To date, no state prohibits the execution of an inmate after a period
of prolonged confinement. In fact, few states have actually considered
the Lackey claim. Since the Lackey claim depends on a prolonged
period of incarceration on death row, only a small handful encounter
the claim in the first place. In practice, the claims predominately
come from California, Florida, and Texas, states with the largest
death row populations .3 ' Likewise, no federal court has found a
violation of the Eighth Amendment to execute an inmate after a
prolonged period of time on death row.
The more persuasive argument may be that society's acceptance of
the death penalty seems to be waning. In 2009, only fifty-two
executions occurred in the United States,3 down from a high in 1998
of ninety-eight executions.3 Fifteen states have abolished the death
penalty entirely.3 Of the states that still permit the use of the death
penalty, the vast majority employ the practice infrequently.39 Even the
number of death sentences issued has dropped dramatically since
1999.40 If for no other reason than the enormous costs that capital
punishment imposes on cash-strapped states, the push for a blanket
abolition of the death penalty appears to be gaining strength.
Since a litigant could not effectively establish a national consensus
against executing persons who have spent a prolonged period of time
on death row, he or she would likely have to rely on this argument in
combination with the arguments that follow.
B. Framers' Intent
The Framers based the Eighth Amendment upon the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776, which was itself derived directly from
the English Bill of Rights of 1689.4 Reference to the English Bills of
Rights provides insight into the Framers' intention when enacting the
Eighth Amendment.
35 Fact Sheet, supra note 14 (Death Row Inmates by State).
36 Id. (Number of Executions Since 1976).
37 Id. (Number of Executions as a bar graph).
38 Id. (States Without the Death Penalty).
39 Id. (Number of Executions Since 1976). Out of the thirty-five states that permit the use
of capital punishment, twenty-eight of the states have executed two or fewer persons within the
past two years. Id.
40 Id. (Death Sentencing as a table). In 2008, the Death Penalty Information center
projected 111 death sentences nationwide. Id. By comparison, more than 300 death sentences
were issued in 1998. Id.
41 Justice Stevens has argued that the "time for a dispassionate, impartial comparison of
the enormous costs that death penalty litigation imposes on society with the benefits that it
produces has surely arrive." Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1548 (2008) (Stevens, J. concurring)
42 See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. Ray. 839, 840-41 (1969).
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Evidence suggests that the English Bills of Rights would have
prevented execution after a prolonged period of confinement. The
English courts would not permit the government to hold a condemned
prisoner for years prior to his or her execution."4
Early American courts also prohibited prolonged death row
incarceration, instead advocating for the "swift infliction of the death
penalty to further penological goals and to prevent the condemned
prisoner from suffering unnecessarily."4 5 In one frequently cited case
from the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court observed that
because a condemned prisoner experiences horrible feelings of
"uncertainty during the whole of it,,,46 holding the prisoner in solitary
confinement for a period of four weeks constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. While this is not to suggest that holding an inmate for
four weeks on death row would amount to a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, there is arguably a point at which the periodic and
regular apprehension of one's execution becomes its own form of
punishment independent of the execution itself, a principle the
Framers were at least cognizant of when they drafted the Eighth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the death
penalty, in part, because the Framers considered it permissible.4 At
minimum then, the Eighth Amendment must be construed to prohibit
those punishments that the Framers considered unconstitutional when
they adopted the Bill of Rights.4 While this is not to suggest that the
converse is true, the Framers' understanding of the Eighth
Amendment lends some support to the argument that prolonged
confinement on death row prior to execution might amount to a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
43 See Riley v. Attorney Gen. of Jamaica, 3 All E.R. 469, 478 (P.C. 1983) (Lord
Scarsman, dissenting).
44 See Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica, 4 All E.R. 769, 774 (P.C. 1993) (en banc)
(holding that "[p]rolonged delay in carrying out a sentence of death after that sentence had been
passed could amount to 'inhuman ... punishment or other treatment' contrary to s 17(l) of the
Jamaican Constitution irrespective of whether the delay was caused by the shortcomings of the
state or the legitimate resort of the accused to all available appellate procedures").
45 See Kathleen M. Flynn, Note, The "Agony of Suspense": How Protracted Death Row
Confinement Gives Rise to an Eighth Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54
WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 291, 300 n.48 (1997) (discussing the speed of execution following
sentencing in early American history).
46 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890) (finding that solitary confinement for a period
of only four weeks constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
47 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.).
48 See Ford v. WVainwright, 477 U.S. 39, 405 (1986).
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C. Penological Goals of Retribution and Deterrence
The Supreme Court stated in Gregg v. Georgia that capital
punishment is constitutionally permissible in part because it might
serve "two principle social purposes: retribution and deterrence." 49
Assuming that capital punishment furthers these penological goals,
the combination of prolonged confinement and execution may not. If
a punishment fails to meet the penological goals it was designed to
address, the punishment is unconstitutional.50
In his Lackey memorandum, Justice John Paul Stevens questioned
whether these penological purposes have "any force" for inmates who
spend a prolonged period of time under sentence of death." 5' Justice
Breyer echoed this argument in Knight v. Florida: "the longer the
delay, the weaker the justification for imposing the death penalty in
terms of punishment's basic retributive or deterrent purposes."52
1. Retributive Theory of Capital Punishment
Under the retributive theory of punishment, a person who commits
a crime should be punished simply because he has done wrong.5
Retributive punishment aims to impose a sanction proportional to
the offender's culpability.5 Prolonged confinements undermine
the retributive value of capital punishment by imposing a
disproportionate punishment. Executing an inmate after prolonged
confinement on death row subjects him to two punishments:
prolonged solitary confinement under sentence of death, and
execution. Society's desire for retribution could be met by imposing
either execution or a prolonged period of solitary confinement. The
combination of the two, however, is gratuitous and unnecessary.
49 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
50 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 n.4 (1977) (plurality opinion) (finding that
capital punishment would be unconstitutional if it did not "measurably serve the legitimate ends
of punishment"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-87 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312-13 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
51 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
52 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
53 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHmENTS 51 (1976)
(discussing the underlying rationale for retributive punishment).
54 FRANCIS ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE (STORRS LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE) 66 (1981) (describing the various
arguments in support of punishment and explaining why proportionality is required for
retributive forms of punishment).
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2. Deterrence Theory of Capital Punishment
Under the deterrence theory, punishment (or the possibility of
punishment) discourages potential criminals from committing future
crimes.55 The deterrent value of capital punishment, though, depends
upon the promptness with which the state inflicts it.56 The longer the
delay between sentencing and execution, the lower the deterrent
effect.
According to a recent survey of criminological societies, however,
nearly 84 percent of the nation's experts reject the argument that the
death penalty deters murder.5 Additional evidence suggests that the
Southern states, which account for more than 80 percent of all
executions, also have the highest murder rates in the country as
compared with the Northern states, which account for less than 1
percent of all executions and have the lowest murder rates in the
country .5
If the death penalty has a minimal deterrent effect when
administered without lengthy delay, then an execution following a
period of significant prolonged confinement would arguably have
even less deterrent effect.
D. International Norms
Though international norms are not binding on the United States,
"the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to
international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual
punishments."' 59 In Foster v. Florida, Justice Breyer argued that the
Court should consider international opinion in deciding a Lackey
claim: "Just as attention to the judgment of other nations can help
Congress determine the justice and propriety of America's measures,
so it can help guide this Court when it decides whether a particular
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment, ,60
55 vON HiRSCH, supra note 53, at 37-44 (describing the argument that punishment is
necessary to deter future crimes).
56 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
57 Fact Sheet, supra note 14 (citing Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence
and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1996)).
58 Id. (citing the 2006 FBI Uniform Crime Report, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/
cius2006/index.htmIr).
59 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
60 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (internal quotation marks and alteration omnitted); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 575;
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958).
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While the use of foreign precedent remains controversial, 61 three
of the Justices in the Atkins and Roper majority 62 are still seated on
the Court and would likely entertain foreign precedent if the Court
were to consider a Lackey claim on its merits. Furthermore,
international precedent is arguably relevant to the Lackey issue
because (a) several foreign courts with similar constitutional
provisions have directly addressed the issue in more detail than any
American court; and (b) an increasing number of countries refuse to
extradite offenders to the United States precisely out of concern that
prolonged confinement on death row violates international standards
of human rights.6 While the federal courts need not follow
international precedent, these particular developments suggest that
executing an inmate after a prolonged period of confinement on death
row may not be consistent with society's evolving standards of
decency.
The Supreme Court has explicitly validated the use of English
precedent, "insofar as those opinions reflect a legal tradition that also
underlies our own Eighth Amendment."64 In Riley v. Attorney
General of Jamaica, British jurists agreed that inordinate delays
awaiting execution invariably violate the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment in the English Declaration of Rights.6 Since the
language of the Eighth Amendment comes directly from the
corresponding provisions of the English Declaration of Rights of
1698,66 it is relevant that England has banned unreasonable delays in
execution.
International precedent surrounding this issue has created some
problems with respect to American extradition requests. In Elledge v.
Florida, Justice Breyer argued that the Court should grant certiorari
61 See Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia, Debate at the American University Washington
College of Law U.S. Association of Constitutional Law Discussion: Constitutional Relevance of
Foreign Court Decisions (January 13, 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic.coml
focus/news/1 352357/posts.
62 Justices Breyer, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg composed the Atkins and
Roper majorities, agreeing that that Eighth Amendment imposed certain restrictions on capital
punishment. Justice Souter retired from the Supreme Court in June 2009 and was replaced
by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Sotomayor' s position on the death penalty is thought
to be unknown, but she has endorsed the use of foreign sources to inform judicial opinions.
See Sonia Sotomayor, Speech to the ACLU of Puerto Rico (April 2009), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/legalissues/wm2525.cfm#-ftnl2. Justice Stevens has also
recently announced his retirement, but presumably he will also be replaced by a Justice with
comparable ideology.
63 See Kate McMahon, Dead Man Waiting: Death Row Delays, The Eighth Amendment,
and What Courts and Legislatures Can Do, 25 HUFF. PUB. MNEREST L. J. 43, 54 (2006).
(,4 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65 Riley v. Attorney General of Jamaica, 3 All E.R. 469, 478 (P.C. 1983).
66 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
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and consider a Lackey claim on its merits to "ease the practical
anomaly created when foreign courts refuse to extradite capital
defendants to America for fear of undue delay in execution . 6  In
Soering v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR") considered whether the United Kingdom would violate
Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which
provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
degrading treatment or punishment," if it extradited a criminal
defendant to the United States (knowing that he would likely face
execution).6 While the ECHR stated that American capital
punishment could be squared with democratic ideals, the Court
refused to extradite based on the fact that "the condemned prisoner
has to endure for many years the conditions on death row and the
anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-present shadow of
death.",69 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada also recently ruled
that the possibility of prolonged incarceration on death row was a
"4relevant consideration" in deciding whether or not extradition to the
United States would violate "principles of 'fundamental justice."' 70
By considering international precedent, a federal court could draw
upon the analysis other courts have used to decide this issue and
simultaneously address the practice problems surrounding extradition
requests.
1111. PRIOR TREATMENT OF THE LACKEY CLAIM
In the years following the reinstatement of capital punishment,'
the Lackey-style claim has only been considered by a handful of
courts. No federal court has affirmatively recognized that an
execution following prolonged confinement under sentence of death
violates the Eighth Amendment. The following section focuses
predominately on the Supreme Court's treatment of the Lackey issue.
In 1995, Clarence Lackey asked the Supreme Court to consider
"twhether executing a prisoner who has already spent seventeen years
on death row violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
67 Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 945 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in I1I Eur.
H.R. Rep. 439, 106 (1989) (holding that extradition of a German citizen to the United States to
face capital murder charges violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
69 Id.
70 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992-93 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (quoting United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S. C. R. 283, 353, 123 (holding that
extradition of an individual to a country where they may face the death penalty is a breach of
fundamental justice under Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)).
71 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (holding that the practice of capital
punishment does not invariably violate the U.S. Constitution).
20091 259
1260 ~CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA WREVIEW [o.5
cruel and unusual punishment. 72 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari, b ut Justice Stevens issued a memorandum remarking that
Lackey's claim was "novel" and "not without foundation."7 While
Justice Stevens went on to describe the underlying claim, he
ultimately concluded that Lackey's claim, "with its legal complexity
and its potential for far-reaching consequences, seems an ideal
example of [a claim] which would benefit from further study" in the
lower courts .7
Three years later, William Elledge, a Florida inmate, asked the
Supreme Court to consider whether execution after twenty-three years
on death row constituted cruel and unusual punishment.76 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari.7 Justice Breyer dissented and
argued that the Court should have granted certiorari to address
Elledge' s claim.78 "[A]n execution may well cease to serve the
legitimate penological purposes that otherwise provide a necessary
constitutional justification for the death penalty,"7 Justice Breyer
wrote, and "a reasoned answer to the 'delay' question could help ease
the practical anomaly created when foreign courts refuse to
,,80
extradite capital defendants.
The Court had occasion to consider the Lackey claim again in
Knight v. Florida and its companion case, Moore v. Nebraska.'
Again, the Court denied certiorari.8 Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a
concurrence to the denial, commenting that there is no American
precedent "for the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of
the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complaln
when his execution is delayed."8 Thomas also claimed that the lower
courts had considered the Lackey claim and had "resoundingly
rejected the claim as meritless. 8 Justice Breyer dissented and
responded to Justice Thomas's claim that the delays were the
inmates' own fault by noting that both cases involved "astonishingly
72 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1047.
'75 Id.
76 Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998).
7'7 Id.
78 Id. at 944 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
79 Id. at 945.
80 Id. (citing Soering v. United Kingdom, I I Eur. H. R. Rep. 439 (1989)).
81 Moore v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 990 (1999).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 990 (Thbomas, J., concuning in denial of certiorari).
84 Id. at 992.
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long delays flowing in significant part from constitutionally defective
death penalty procedures."8
In 2002, Charles Kenneth Foster, another Florida inmate, asked the
Court to consider his Lackey claim after spending more than twenty-
86 87seven years on death row.8  The Court denied certiorari. Justice
Thomas wrote to say that nothing had changed since the Court last
"debated this meritless claim in Knight v. Florida. 88 Justice Breyer
reiterated his earlier position that the Court should hear these types of
claims, if for no other reason than the "27 years awaiting execution is
unusual by any standard, even that of current practice in the United
States.",89 According to Justice Breyer, Foster would be "punished
both by death and also by more than a generation spent in death row's
twilight. It is fairly asked whether such punishment is both unusual
and cruel."90
Five years later, Joe Clarence Smith asked the Court to consider
whether execution after thirty years on death row constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. 91 The Supreme Court denied certiorari .9
Justice Breyer again argued that the Court should consider the
claim. 9 3
In late 2008, William Lee Thompson, another Florida inmate,
asked the Court to consider whether execution after thirty-two years
on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 94 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, reigniting the debate between
Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Thomas.9
For the first time, all three Justices contemporaneously offered
their perspectives on the Lackey claim. 97 "Today, condemned inmates
await execution for an average of nearly 13 years," Stevens wrote in
his opinion respecting the denial of certiorari .9 8 "This figure," he
continued, "underscores the fundamental inhumanity and
unworkability of the death penalty as it is administered in the United
States." 99
85 Id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
86 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
89 Id. at 992 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
90 Id. at 993.
9' Smith v. Arizona, 128 S. Ct. 466 (2007).
92 Id.
93 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
94 Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299 (2009).
95 Id. at 1299.
96 Id. at 1299-1304.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1300 (Stevens, J., concurring).
99 Id.
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Justice Thomas argued that Thompson himself caused the delay
through his legal efforts to overturn his death sentence.' 00 "It makes a
mockery of our system of justice . . . for a convicted murder, who,
through his own interminable efforts of delay . . . has secured
the almost indefinite postponement of his sentence, to then claim
that the almost-indefinite postponement renders his sentence
unconstitutional," Thomas wrote.101 "It is incongruous to arm capital
defendants with an arsenal of 'constitutional' claims with which they
may delay their executions, and simultaneously to complain when
executions are inevitably delayed," he concluded. 102
Justice Breyer emphasized that the issue is over the "punishment,
not the gruesome nature of the crime," 10 3 and noted that the "the delay
[in Thompson's case] resulted in significant part from constitutionally
defective death penalty procedures for which petitioner was not
responsible."' 0 Breyer argued that a petitioner should not lose his
Eighth Amendment claim simply because he exercises his Fourteenth
Amendment right to appellate review. 105
IV. COMMON OBJECTIONS TO THE L4cKEY CLAIM
For fourteen years, Justice Stevens has urged the Supreme Court
and the lower courts alike to consider the Lackey claim on its
merits. 0 6 And yet the federal courts consistently refuse to hear the
Lackey claim, citing any number of procedural or substantive barriers
that purportedly prevent adjudication of the claim. The following
section describes some of the most common objections to the Lackey
claim as well as counter-arguments that may overcome these
objections.
A. Procedural Barriers
Lackey claimants face considerable obstacles to a favorable
adjudication of their claims. Before a federal court will consider the
substantive issues underlying the Lackey claim, the inmate must
overcome two significant procedural barriers that arise essentially
because the claim only ripens after a significant period of time has
1001d. at 1301-02 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101 Id. at 1301.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1304 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104Id. at 1303.
105 Id.
106See Lackey v. Texas, 5 14 U. S. 1045, 1047 (Stevens, J., respecting deni al of certiorari)
(suggesting that the Lackey claim raises a substantive Eighth Amendment claim that the lower
courts should consider on its merits).
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elapsed: (1) the Court's holding in Teague; and (2) the procedural
requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA").
1. Teague: The Prohibition Against Retroactive Application of New
Constitutional Rules
In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court decided that federal courts
may not retroactively apply new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure in cases where judgment is final. 107 In practice, a court
must first determine when the judgment became final, typically when
the inmate has exhausted his direct appeals or when the time limits
for filing an appeal have expired. Once the court determines that date,
it must compare it with the date the new constitutional rule of
procedure was announced. If the rule was announced after the date
when the judgment became final, then the claim must be rejected as
Teague-barred. 108
On its face, Tea gue might appear to prevent a Lackey claim
because it requests application of a new constitutional rule to a
judgment that has long since become final. By definition, the factual
predicate for a Lackey claim only develops after a significant period
of time. The inmate will certainly have exhausted his direct appeals
by the time he decides to bring a Lackey claim for unnecessary delay.
And since there is no binding precedent for the Lackey claim, it would
by necessity rely on a new rule of constitutional law.
But federal courts have disagreed over the Tea gue doctrine's
application in the Lackey context.1'9 If the court treats the claim as a
collateral attack on a final judgment, then Teague applies and the
claim is barred. However, if the claim is treated as a demand for relief
for a post-conviction constitutional violation, then Teague does not
apply.
The Court has also recognized two exceptions to Tea gue that may
apply to a Lackey claim. The first exception is when the announced
107See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (determining that courts cannot
retroactively apply new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to cases on collateral review).
1
0 8 See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990) (determining that a new rule exists even
if it resolves questions in manner "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds"); Saffle v.
Parks, 493 U.S. 484,488-90 (1990) (finding existence of a new rule despite rule's foundation in
prior case law).
"~Compare McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1468 n.15 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding
application of Teague to Lackey claim inappropriate because Lackey claims "cannot be raised on
direct appeal because much of the delay complained of arises in post-conviction proceedings"),
with Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1995) (determining that petitioner's Eighth
Amendment delay claim proposed a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure and finding
the claims barred on collateral review by Teague).
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constitutional law changes the criminal law substantively. 1 0 The
second exception occurs when the new rule of constitutional law
concerns fundamental constitutional principles "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.""' 1 The new rule of constitutional law that
a Lackey claim would create could satisfy either exception. First, the
Lackey claim does not propose a new rule of criminal procedure;
instead, substantive constitutional law provides the underlying basis
for the Lackey claim." 2 Second, the Lackey claim relies on the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, a
fundamental constitutional principle.
By making these arguments, defendants may be able to overcome
the Teague rule, clearing the first procedural barrier to a Lackey
claim.
2. AEDPA: The Prohibition Against Second or Successive Habeas
Petitions
The second procedural barrier facing a Lackey claimant is the bar
on second or successive habeas petitions created by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Since a litigant with a
viable Lackey claim will inevitably bring the claim in a second or
successive habeas petition, long after exhausting his direct and
collateral appeals, AIEDPA is implicated.
Under AEDPA's gate-keeping provision, "[a] claim presented in a
second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254
that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed"
except under certain, narrow circumstances."' To fall into these
narrow circumstances, the habeas petitioner must demonstrate that his
claim either "relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," '1 or
relies on new facts which could not have been discovered previously
and which, if proven, "establish by clear and convincing evidence
that, but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense."'"
A strict interpretation of AEDPA' s gate-keeping provisions places
inmates with potential Lackey claims in a difficult position: either
they must assert their Lackey claim in their first habeas petition (even
10 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).
111Id. (citing Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693).
112 See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-47 (Stevens, I., respecting denial of certiorari) (arguing
that the Lackey claim rests on the Eighth Amendment).
113 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-().
14Id.
115Id.
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though the inmate may continue to remain on death row years after
submitting his first habeas petition) or they risk losing the opportunity
to raise the claim in federal court altogether.
Requiring a petitioner to include a potential Lackey claim in their
first petition could be described as "[amn empty formality . . . [that]
neither respects the limited legal resources available to the States nor
encourages the exhaustion of state remedies. Instructing prisoners to
file premature claims, particularly when many of these claims will not
be colorable even at a later date, does not conserve judicial resources,
' reduc~e] piecemeal litigation,' or 'streamiinie] federal habeas
proceedings."" 16
Since a Lackey-style claim, or a claim challenging the actual
length of confinement under sentence of death, by definition
considers the length of time between conviction or sentencing and the
date of execution, the claim only becomes ripe when execution is
imminent. Requiring the petitioner to submit his Lackey claim in his
original habeas application "would add to the burden imposed on
courts, applicants, and the States, with no clear advantage to any."'1
A federal court faced with a Lackey claim in the original habeas
petition would have to dismiss the claim as unripe and factually
unsupported. The petitioner could very well continue to remain in
confinement under sentence of death for years and years after the
district court originally adjudicated his habeas petition. That
additional delay, often attributable to the state, creates the factual
predicate for a Lackey claim, a factual predicate that the petitioner
cannot anticipate when he files his original habeas petition.
The alternative, permitting petitioners to file a successive petition
for constitutional claims that only become ripe when execution is
imminent, preserves judicial resources by ensuring that district courts
only consider factually-supported, ripe constitutional claims. In fact,
the Supreme Court has expressed hesitance in construing AEDPA "in
a manner that would require unripe (and, often, factually
unsupported) claims to be raised as a mere formality, to the benefit of
no party.""
The Court has consistently declined to interpret "second or
successive" as referring to all §2254 applications filed second or
successively in time, even when the later filings address a state-court
I 6 Panetti, 551 U.S. 930, 946 (citations omitted).
"17Panetti, 551 U.S. at 943.
118Panettl v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 947 (2007) (holding that AEDPA's har on
"second or successive" petitions does not prevent an inmate from filing a second §2254
application raising a Ford-based incompetency claim, so long as the claim is filed as soon as it
becomes ripe).
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judgment already challenged in a prior §2254 application. 1 9 AEDPA
specifically aims to "further the principles of comity, finality, and
federalism.",12 0 To that end, construing AEDPA to foreclose review of
the Lackey claim does not further the goals of the statute, but would
'' produce troublesome results,'' ''create procedural anomalies,'' and
"4close [the] doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review
without any clear indication that such was Congress' intent.",12'
Construing AEDPA to foreclose review of a Lackey claim produces
the same absurd results that the Supreme Court expressed concern
over in Panetti v. Quarterman.122 There, the Court held that, because
an incompetency claim was not ripe until the defendant's execution
was imminent, it was unreasonable to construe AEDPA as barring
such a claim when raised in a second habeas petition. While the
Panetti holding was confined to competency to be executed claims,
the underlying justifications for permitting the claim in spite of
AEDPA's requirements should arguably apply to any claim that by
definition only becomes ripe long after the first habeas petition is
filed. This, of course, would include Lackey claims, which by their
very nature are not ripe until the inmate has spent a significant period
of time on death row and the execution is imminent.
Since a federal court could not resolve an unripe Lackey claim
when the first habeas petition would be filed, allowing this particular
class of petitioners (those who have experienced a prolonged period
of confinement prior to their proposed execution) to file second or
successive habeas petitions would simply not implicate AEDPA's
concern for finality.1 23 If the district court could not have adjudicated
the claim because it was unripe at the time of the first habeas petition,
then there is no risk that a petitioner will assert the same claim over
and over, as AIEDPA is intended to prevent.
"
9 See id. (holding that AEDPA's bar on "second or successive" petitioners did not
prevent petitioner from filing a second §2254 application raising a Ford-based incompetency
claim, filed as soon as the claim became ripe); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000)
(concluding that a second §2254 application was not "second or successive" after petitioner's
first application, which had challenged the same state-court judgment, had been dismissed for
failure to exhaust state remedies); see also Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 645
(1998) (holding petitioner's request for habeas relief on the basis of reopening a claim that had
been dismissed as premature was not subject to the bar on "second or successive" petitions).
120 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003).
121 -Casto v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 380 (2003).
123 See Martinez- Vi llareal, 523 U.S. at 64 4-45 (acknowledging that that district court was
unable to resolve the prisoner's incompetency claim at the time of his initial habeas filing).
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B. Substantive Barriers
Even if a litigant successfully overcomes the procedural barriers
discussed above, the litigant must still convince the court to consider
the claim on its merits, despite the noticeable lack of precedent. To
adjudicate the claim, a court would have to consider when and under
what circumstances the punishment moves from constitutionally
permissible to constitutionally impermissible.
To date, no American court has affirmatively recognized that an
execution following a prolonged period on death row violates the
Eighth Amendment.124  But the federal courts have also neither
extensively considered the claim nor dismissed it on its merits. The
following section proposes that federal courts should consider the
Lackey claim as a matter of first impression and then apply a formula
similar to that used in Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims. This
would allow the federal courts to reach the merits of the Lackey claim
and filter out those situations where the inmate caused the delay by
engaging in frivolous litigation.
In Knight v. Florida, Justice Thomas claimed that the lower courts
had "resoundingly rejected the [Lackey] claim as meritless," 25 citing
eight cases that purportedly demonstrate that the Lackey claim is not
viable.126 However, the cited cases come from only six states,127 and
at least one of those cases explicitly rejected the Lackey claim
because of the lack of precedent, not on its own constitutional
merits.128 Since the Lackey claim arises only after a significant period
of incarceration on death row, a relatively small number of cases will
present a viable Lackey claim in the first place. Practically speaking,
the vast majority of Lackey claims come directly from the states with
the largest death row populations: California, Florida, and Texas.129
124 See supra Part Il.
125 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
1261d. (citing People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 262 (Cal. 1998); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d
29, 44-45 (Cal. 1998); Ex Parte Bush, 695 So. 2d 138, 140 (Ala. 1997); State v. Schackart, 947
P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 862 (1998); Bell v. State, 938 S.w.2d 35, 53
(Tex. Grim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 827 (1997); State v. Sm-ith, 931 P.3d 1272,
1287-88 (Mont. 1996); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439-440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 911 (1996); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cit. 1995)).
127 Id.
128 See Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995); Stafford v. Surte, 899 P.2d
657, 659-60 (Okla. Grim. App. 1995) (refusing to review the Lackey claim because there was
no prior precedent and the inmate failed to raise the claim in prior proceedings).
129 Prisoners routinely assert Lackey claims through their habeas petitions; however,
practically speaking, the strongest Lackey claims involve significant periods of delay-most
common in states with the largest death row populations. The cases that have attracted the
attention of at least one Supreme Court Justice have predominately come from Texas and
Florida. See supra Part IV.
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Since most states will not be in a position to adjudicate a Lackey
claim, the Supreme Court should treat the issue as a matter of first
impression rather than relying on the limited number of lower court
opinions.
And while the lower courts have expressed some reluctance to
adjudicate the Lackey claim on its merits (particularly after Justice
Thomas declared in Knight v. Florida that the issue had been
resolved130), the problem that produces the foundation for the Lackey
claim is unlikely to resolve itself. Since all evidence suggests that the
average time between sentencing and execution will continue to
increase,131 the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and consider
the Lackey claim as a matter of first impression.
If the Supreme Court grants certiorari to consider the claim, the
Court must consider if, when, and under what circumstances an
inmate's prolonged confinement transitions from constitutionally
permissible and necessary to ensure due process to constitutionally
impermissible and violative of the Eighth Amendment. Several
commentators have proposed setting a threshold time period of
required confinement upon which claimants could bring Lackey
claims and requiring claimants to attribute the time to the various
parties involved to determine if the delay resulted from the inmate's
own efforts to delay the proceedings or from the state's (or court's)
actions.132 This proposal borrows from the rules established under the
Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment speedy trial jurisprudence.133
The first step to resolving the Lackey claim is to establish when an
inmate may bring a Lackey claim. When the inmate reaches this
particular point, a rebuttable presumption is created that executing the
inmate is constitutionally impermissible. Consequently, the
"threshold" must be sufficiently high so as to address only those
situations where the delay between sentencing and execution is
abnormally long. In his article, Getting Out of This Mess: Steps
130 See McMahon, supra note 63, at 59 (citing McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144 (Idaho
1999); Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 2003); Jordan v. State, 786 So. 2d 987 (Miss.
2001); People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 2000); Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46 (Ind.
2002); State v. Lafferty, 20 P. 3d 342 (Utah 200 1)).
131 DOJ Tables, supra note 1.
13 2 See Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution
Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 147, 207-08 (1998)
(arguing that an inordinate delay claim should be ripe for review when an "inmate has been
under a sentence of death for twice as long as the national average of time spent on death row");
McMahon, supra note 63, at 62-70 (adopting the Speedy Trial Analog for Eighth Amendment
delay analysis); Jeremy Root, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Reconsideration of the Lackey
Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281. 320-24 (2001) (analogizing Sixth Amendment
Speedy Trial procedures to the Eighth Amendment delay claim).
133 See Barker v. wingo, 431 U.S. 514 (1972) (considering whether it was unconstitutional
to bring a defendant to trial five years after the initial arrest).
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Toward Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases,
Dwight Aarons proposed a "threshold" time when the delay reaches
twice the national average for persons executed in the United
States. 3 Applying Aarons' s proposal to the current statistics, an
inmate could bring a Lackey claim after spending twenty-five years
and six months on death row.135 By establishing a "threshold" number
where the Court will presume constitutionally impermissible delay,
the Court would respond to the delay problem while still permitting
states to use the death penalty (albeit carefully so as to avoid
inordinate delays).
The second step to considering the Lackey claim will be to
attribute the time in the particular case to the parties involved. In his
Lackey memorandum, Justice Stevens proposed distinguishing
between "delays resulting from (a) a petitioner's abuse of the judicial
system by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner's
legitimate exercise of his right to review; and (c) negligence or
deliberate actions by the state."'136 By attributing time in these cases,
the Court could ensure that inmates who intentionally delay
proceedings will not then benefit by having their death sentence
commuted. Aarons suggested that, "when there has been an inordinate
delay between the imposition of the sentence and the pending
execution, the state is usually directly responsible for a great part of
the delay." 3
In those cases where the petitioner has reached the threshold time
period and where the delay is attributable to the state, either through
negligent or deliberate actions, the petitioner should be entitled to a
commuted sentence. And where the delay is attributable to the
petitioner's own repetitive or frivolous filings, then no relief should
be available.
CONCLUSION
Prolonged incarceration under sentence of death should be cause
for concern. As one court has stated:
134 Dwight Aarons, Criminal Law: Getting Out of This Mess: Steps Toward Addressing
and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 891J. CRJM. L. & CRIMOLOGY I(Fall 1998).
13 5 D0J Tables, supra note 1 (establishing that the average delay between sentencing and
execution is approximately 153, twice that number is 306 months, or twenty-five years and sixth
months).
'
36 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari).
137 Aarons, supra note 134, at 48.
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There must be a point ... at which the court steps in and says
enough is enough. Beyond a certain number of years and a
certain number of failed attempts by the State to secure a
constitutionally valid sentence of death, the litigation
becomes a form of torture in and of itself. It's as if the State
were holding a defective pistol to the defendant's head day
and night for years on end and the weapon kept misfiring. It
may eventually go off, but then again, it may not, and the
defendant has no way to be sure. 138
The Supreme Court recently balked at an opportunity to resolve
the Lackey issue 139 and, in so doing, continued to exacerbate the
situation by leaving litigants and lower courts alike in a state of
uncertainty. As the period of time between sentencing and execution
steadily increases, the Lackey issue will continue to come up until the
Court issues a definitive ruling on the matter.
ERI SIMMONS'
138 People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092 (Ill. 2000).
139 Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299 (2009).
tThe author wishes to thank those who have reviewed this comment and offered their
own perspectives and contributions.
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